Is There a Ray of Hope for Hague Convention Email Service on China-Based Defendants?
August 21, 2026 – American Bar Association's Intellectual Property Litigation JournalSeasoned intellectual property litigators know well the frustration posed by the need to serve China-based defendants in infringement litigation under the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. The Convention sets forth the means of effecting lawful service of process (summons and complaint) in accordance with China’s reservations and declarations to the Convention. Under the Convention, China requires that service requests be made online to a designated Central Authority office with a mandatory cover form and translated copies of the pleadings.
China’s declaration to the Convention states:
The Central Authority of China refers the document to the competent court. The court will serve the document directly to the addressee or the person who is entitled to receive the document. Where direct service is impracticable in some cases, other methods may be employed in accordance with the Civil Procedure Law.
Typically, it can take up to six months for the Central Authority to effect service and return the necessary confirmation for filing as proof of service in a district court action.
Rule 4(f)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that service on a party based in a foreign country shall be made under “any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention.” Rule 4(f)(3) also provides that service may be made “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.” Article 10(a) of the Convention provides that so long as the “State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with... the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.”
The issue that has plagued plaintiffs’ counsel is whether, under the Convention, service by email can be made on a China-based company pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) when, for example, its postal mailing address is unknown or uncertain, or when the time delay of effecting non-email service through the convention would be prejudicial to a plaintiff’s interests. In a 2025 decision of first impression, the Second Circuit held that China’s declaration to the convention effectively prohibited service of process by email on China-based defendants, which in that case had been accused of counterfeiting. Smart Study Co. LTD. v. Acuteye-US, 2025 WL 3672740 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2025).
The court noted that while some district courts had broadly construed “postal channels” under Article 10(a) to permit email service, China had expressly objected to service “by the methods provided by Article 10 of the convention.” Because China rejected postal service and Article 10(a) makes no reference to alternate email service, the Court also rejected prior district court decisions that had permitted email service on China-based defendants, noting that “it would make little sense for a nation to object to a method of service not identified or authorized by the Convention, since, as the district court explained, ‘there would be nothing affirmative to object to.’” [Citation omitted]
Despite the Second Circuit’s mandate, on February 9, 2026, Southern District Judge Jed Rakoff held that, based on a showing by Google that it had made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to ascertain legitimate postal addresses for 25 unnamed defendants, which allegedly constituted a China-based criminal phishing enterprise, the defendants could properly be served electronically. Google v. Doe 1 et al., 2026 WL 353660 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026). Judge Rakoff wrote that “because defendants’ addresses are not known, the Hague Convention does not apply to prohibit email service.” The judge reasoned that the Convention does not apply where a postal address for the person to be served in China cannot reasonably be ascertained or does not exist, and in such cases service by email and publication is permissible under Rule 4(f)(3).
Whether this ruling will survive a potential Second Circuit appeal is uncertain, although Judge Rakoff’s decision appears rational where no postal address is available for a China-based defendant. If in this situation email service were never permitted, there would be no viable way to serve such defendants where there otherwise exists a basis for personal jurisdiction in the United States. Certainly, where a valid postal address is available, which can be confirmed with assistance from local Chinese counsel or investigators, service should adhere to the Convention and be made through the Chinese Central Authority, time consuming as it may be.